STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioners, v. UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, EMPLOYERS\u27 REINSURANCE FUND, and KATHLEEN MAE MOORE, surviving spouse of William Moore, Respondents : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners, v. UTAH LABOR COMMISSION,
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND, and
KATHLEEN MAE MOORE, surviving spouse of
William Moore, Respondents : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sandra N. Dredge; Attorney for Respondent; Erie V. Boorman; Alan H. Hennebold.
Michael E. Dyer; Dori K. Petersen; Attorney for Petitioners.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Stouffer Food Corporation v. Utah Labor Commission, No. 980227 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1498
y t M H COUH r OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS & F y 
50 
r^m 
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Petitioners, 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, and KATHLEEN MAE 
MOORE, surviving spouse of William Moore, 
DOCKET NO. 1&0 2szi-tXh 
Court of Appeals 
Appellate Court No.: 980227-CA 
Priority No.: 7 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. 
Appeal from the Labor Commission of Utah 
Administrative Law Judge Barbara A. Elicerio 
Sandra N. Dredge 
Attorney for Respondent 
Kathleen Mae Moore 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 100 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Erie V. Boorman 
Attorney for Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
P.O. Box 146611 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611 
Alan H. Hennebold 
Deputy Commissioner, Utah Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Michael E. Dyer 
Dori K. Petersen 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Stouffer Food Corporation and/or 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1609 
FILED 
Utah Court of Aooeals 
PETITIONERS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT 2 3 1998 
AND THAT THIS CASE BE REPORTED. 
Julia D'Ales&ndro 
Clerk of the Court 
- IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS --
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Petitioners, Court of Appeals 
v. 
Appellate Court No.: 980227-CA 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, EMPLOYERS' Priority No.: 7 
REINSURANCE FUND, and KATHLEEN MAE 
MOORE, surviving spouse of William Moore, 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. 
Appeal from the Labor Commission of Utah 
Administrative Law Judge Barbara A. Elicerio 
Sandra N. Dredge Michael E. Dyer 
Attorney for Respondent Dori K. Petersen 
Kathleen Mae Moore Attorneys for Petitioners 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 100 Stouffer Food Corporation and/or 
Provo, Utah 84604 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Erie V. Boorman Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1609 
Attorney for Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
P.O. Box 146611 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611 
Alan H. Hennebold 
Deputy Commissioner, Utah Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
PETITIONERS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND THAT THIS CASE BE REPORTED. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 1 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 35-1-70 AND 35-1-68 PROVIDES FOR 
THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND TO PAY DEATH BENEFITS 
AFTER THE FIRST SIX YEARS 1 
CONCLUSION 6 
EXHIBITS E-l, E-2 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Brinkerhoffv. Forsvth. 779 P.2d 685 (Utah 1989) 1 
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntvre Investment Co.. 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998) 1 
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic. Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995) . . 2 
Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994) 1 
State ex relA.B.. 936 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1997) 1 
State v. Valdez. 933 P.2d 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 2 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997) 1,2 
Visitor Info. Ctr. Auth. V. Customer Ser. Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 
930 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1997) 1 
V-1 Oil Company v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997) 1 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 2, 3 
TREATISES: 
2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.08, at 35, 5th Ed. 1992 . . . . 1 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 35-1-70 AND 35-1-68 PROVIDES 
FOR THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND TO PAY 
DEATH BENEFITS AFTER THE FIRST SIX YEARS. 
The Utah appellate courts have repeatedly declared that when "[fjaced with a question 
of statutory construction, [the court will] first examine the plain language of the statute." 
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co.. 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998); accord Stephens 
v.Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997); V-1 Oil Company v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d 906, 916 (Utah 1997). This Court has explained that '"[w]here 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to 
divine legislative intent.'" State ex rel A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah 1997) (quoting 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added)). As the Utah 
Supreme Court explained, "The reason for such a rule is clear. It prevents judges from 
'finding' an ambiguity . . . in an attempt to justify an interpretation they prefer." Salt Lake 
Citv v. Ohms, the 881 P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, as the court noted in 
State ex rel A.B.: "to interpret statutes by reference to legislative debates actually erodes [the] 
due process notice function of [the] statute." 936 P.2d at 1097 (citing 2A Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.08, at 35 (5th Ed. 1992)). When the statute on its face 
is clear, the court will not '"delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history."' ]sL (quoting 
Visitor Info. Or. Auth. V. Customer Ser. Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 930 P.2d 1196, 
1 
1198 (Utah 1997)): accord Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic. Inc. v. Frederick. 890 
P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("'When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to 
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" (citations omitted)); S££ also 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997) (where statutory language is 
plan and unambiguous, the court will refuse to consider "or otherwise attempt to assess the 
wisdom of the legislation."); State v. Valdez. 933 P.2d 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating 
"only if the plain language of the statute is unclear do we 'resort to legislative history and 
purpose for guidance.'" (citation omitted)). 
The language of Section 35-1-70, is clear and unambiguous. The section reads as 
follows: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the 
benefits of this title, at the termination of such benefits are yet in 
a dependent condition, and under all reasonable circumstances 
should be entitled to additional benefits, the Industrial 
Commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such 
benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier 
involved shall not be extended, and the additional benefits 
allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in 
subdivision (1) of §35-1-68. 
(Emphasis added). 
The statute clearly and unambiguously states that the liability of the employer or 
insurance carrier shall not be extended beyond 312 weeks. The statute further clearly and 
unambiguously states that the additional benefits shall be paid out of the special fund provided 
for in subdivision (1) of § 35-1-68. Section 35-1-68 clearly and unambiguously states that the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund is created "for the purpose of making payments in accordance 
with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35" and that "[w]henever [the] code refers to the 'Special Fund,' . 
2 
. . that reference is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund."1 
Respondents would have this Court find an ambiguity in the statute in order to look to 
the legislative history. This is unnecessary and contrary to the rules of statutory construction. 
Rather, the Court need look no further than the specific language of the statute. The specific 
language of Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68 provides that the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund 
was created "for the purpose of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 
35." Read with Section 70, which expressly designates that the liability for additional benefits 
(those benefits beyond the first 312 weeks) "shall be paid out of the special fund provided for 
in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68," the statutory intend is clear and unambiguous. 
Nevertheless, the Employers Reinsurance Fund argues that the statute should be interpreted to 
impose no liability whatsoever. This interpretation is starkly contrary to the express language 
of the statute. 
Furthermore, the express language of Sections 68 and 70 provides only for six years or 
312 weeks of liability for death benefits to the employer or its insurance carrier. Specifically, 
Section 68 states that the employer or its insurance carrier will pay compensation "during 
dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and the expiration of 
six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury." Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(a)(i) 
(1988). There is no express provision for liability beyond this period. Rather, Section 70 
expressly provides that "the liability of the employer or insurance carrier shall not be 
extended." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988). 
lA complete copy of Section 35-1-68 (1987) is attached hereto as Exhibit "1 
3 
Respondents argue that a 1979 amendment to Section 35-1-68 eliminated any liability 
for the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to pay death benefits. As outlined in Petitioners' 
original brief, a plain reading of the statute does not reflect this asserted change. Rather, the 
shift in liability from the Employers Reinsurance Fund to the employer and/or its insurance 
carrier was not accomplished until 1994. The 1994 amendment modified Subdivision (1) of 
Section 35-1-68 to read as follows: 
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the 
purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or 
occupational disease occurring on or before June 30. 1994. The 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability for industrial 
accidents or occupational disease occurring on or after July 1. 
1994. This fund shall succeed to all monies previously held in 
the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second 
Injury Fund." Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," 
the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund" that 
reference is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall make provisions for 
and direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration or 
other fees may be paid from the fund. 
(Emphasis added) (A full copy of Utah Code § 35-1-68 (1994) is attached hereto as Exhibit 
If, as Respondents assert, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was relieved of all liability 
with the 1979 amendment, why does the 1994 statute expressly state that (1) the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund is created for "the purpose of making payments" for industrial injuries "on 
or before June 301994"\ and (2) the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability for 
industrial injuries occurring "on or after July 1, 1994." If the Legislature had intended the 
1994 amendment merely as a clarification of the 1979 amendment, the Legislature would not 
4 
have expressly chosen June 30, 1994 as the date when the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's 
liability for death benefits terminated.2 
The 1994 amendment made other significant changes to Section 68 which demonstrate 
that it was not until after June 30, 1994, that the employer and/or its insurance carrier was 
liable for death benefits beyond the initial 312 week period. First, the 1994 amendment to 
Section 68 added specific language requiring employers or carriers to pay death benefits to 
wholly dependent persons after the expiration of the first 312 week period. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-l-68(5)(a)(ii) (1994). 
Second, the 1994 amendment to Section 68 deleted the provision which required an 
employer or carrier to pay to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund the difference between the 
amounts paid to wholly or partly dependent persons and $30,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-
l-68(2)(d) (1988) in comparison with Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (1994). As explained in 
Petitioner's original brief, it makes little sense to have an employer or carrier pay benefits to 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for death cases if the Employers' Reinsurance Fund has no 
liability whatsoever for death benefits. Rather, the logical assumption under the language of 
1988 version of Section 68 is that the employer/carrier which pays less than $30,000 in a death 
case (a relatively small amount) should be required to pay the difference to the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund to help fund the Employers' Reinsurance Fund when it has to pay death 
benefits. The 1994 amendment deleted this provision of Section 68 since the Employers' 
2While the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was also relieved of liability for permanent total 
disability claims in 1994, Section 68 specifically deals with death benefits The Legislature shifted 
liability for permanent total disability benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the 
employer and/or its insurance carrier through amendments to Section 35-1-67 of the Act. 
5 
Reinsurance Fund was expressly relieved of liability for death benefits after July 1, 1994. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory provisions of the Workers Compensation Act in effect at the time of Mr. 
Moore's injury and death, Section 35-1-68 and 35-1-70 (1988), are clear and unambiguous on 
their face. Accordingly, this Court need not look beyond the plain language of the statute to 
divine legislative intent from the asserted legislative history. The plain and unambiguous 
language of the statute provides that an employer or carrier must pay death benefits for up to 312 
weeks after the date of injury, with the Employers' Reinsurance Fund making payments thereafter. 
This Court has already examined this issue in Hales v Industrial Commission, finding that there is 
a continuation of death benefits by the "fund" under Section 68. Accordingly, this Court should 
follow the plain language of Sections 68 and 70 and award benefits to Ms. Moore from the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. Further, Petitioners Stouffers Food Corporation and Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co. should be awarded reimbursement from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
for all benefits paid to Ms. Moore beyond the initial 312 week period. 
Respectfully submitted this^f^day of October, 1998. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Michael E. Dyer 
Dori K. Petersen 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Stouffer Food Corporation and/or 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
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The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the. 
termination of the vocational training of the e m p p 
oyee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah 
the work the employee is qualified to perform, aad\ 
thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the 
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine 
whether the employee has, notwithstanding such 
rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. . . . 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of, 
both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs » 
or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total 
and permanent disability, to be compensated acco-^ 
rding to the provisions of this section and no tent* 
ative finding of permanent total disability is requ-
ired in those instances. In all other cases where there, 
has been rehabilitation effected but where there it 
some loss of bodily function, the award shall be? 
based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance 
carrier be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind as provided 
in Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section; 
including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week for 312 weeks. ists 
35-1-68. Second Injun Fund - Injury causing 
death - Burial expenses - Payments to 
dependents. 
(1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the 
purpose of making payments in accordance with 
Chapters 1 and 2. This fund shall succeed to all 
monies heretofore held in that fund designated as 
the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" 
and whenever reference is made elsewhere in this 
code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury 
Fund" that reference shall be deemed to be to the 
Second Injury Fund. The state treasurer shall be the 
custodian of the Second Injury Fund and the com-
mission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable 
administration assistance may be paid from the 
proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall 
appoint a member of his staff to represent the 
Second Injury Fund in all proceedings brought to 
enforce claims against it. 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six 
years from the date of the accident, the employer or 
insurance earner shall pay the burial expenses of the 
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and 
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons 
as follows: 
(a)(i) If there are wholly dependent persons at 
the time of the death, the payment by the employer 
or insurance carrier shall be 66-2/3% of the 
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 
per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of 18 
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent 
minor children not to exceed the average weekly 
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but 
not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week, to continue 
during dependency for the remainder of the period 
between the date of the death and not to exceed six 
years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent 
persons during dependency following the expiration 
of the first six-year period described in Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly 
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons 
jjng that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% 
any w e e k *y federal Social Security death benefits 
to those wholly dependent persons. 
wm. (iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject 
itview by the commission at the end of the initial 
.year period and annually thereafter. If in any 
review it is determined that, under the facts 
circumstances existing at that time, the appli-
ed is no longer a wholly dependent person, the 
©licant may be considered a partly dependent or 
independent person and shall be paid such benefits 
the commission may determine under Subsection 
(b)Gi). 
«.; (iv) For purposes of any dependency deter-
Uunation, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee 
jjfrftll be conclusively presumed to be wholly depen-
dent for a six-year period from the date of death 
W the employee. This presumption shall not apply 
Jfter the initial six-year period and, in determining 
"Jae then existing annual income of the surviving 
ipouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any 
'federal Social Security death benefits received by 
Tthat surviving spouse. 
ft. (b)(i) If there are partly dependent persons at 
'the time of the death, the payment shall be 66-
2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than 
a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during 
dependency for the remainder of the period between 
the date of death and not to exceed six years or 312 
weeks after the date of injury as the commission in 
each case may determine and shall not amount to 
more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits 
provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping 
with the circumstances and conditions of depend-
ency existing at the date of injury, and any amount 
awarded by the commission under this subsection 
must be consistent with the general provisions of 
this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be 
partly dependent under Subsection (2)(a)(iii) shall be 
determined by the commission in keeping with the 
circumstances and conditions of dependency existing 
at the time of the dependency review and may be 
paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the 
maximum weekly 'rate that partly dependent person 
would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid 
to such persons during their dependency by the 
employer or insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and 
also partly dependent persons at the time of death, 
the commission may apportion the benefits as it 
deems just and equitable; provided, that the total 
benefits awarded to all parties concerned shall not 
exceed the maximum provided for by law. 
(d) If there are wholly or partly dependent 
persons at the time of death and the total amount of 
the awards paid by the employer or its insurance 
carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination 
of dependency, including any remarriage settlement, 
does not exceed $30,000, the employer or its insur-
ance carrier shall pay the difference between the 
amount paid and $30,000 into the Second Injury 
Fund provided for in Subsection (1). 1987 
35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in 
permanent incapacity - Payment out of Second 
Injury Fund - Training of employee. 
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interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent 
total disability finding, except if the employee does not 
prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1000. The 
attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insur-
ance carrier in addition to the permanent total disability 
compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication 
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured 
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall con-
tinue to pay the permanent total disability compensation 
benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1996 
35-1-68. Employers' Reinsurance Fund — Injury cans-
hog death — Burial expenses — Payments to 
dependents. 
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for 
the purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or 
occupational diseases occurring on or before June 30, 1994. 
The payments shall be made in accordance with Title 35, 
Chapters 1 and 2. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall 
have no liability for industrial accidents or occupational 
diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. This fund shall 
succeed to all monies previously held in the "Special Fund," 
the "Combined Injury Fund,* or the "Second Injury Fund." 
Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," the "Com-
bined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund" that refer-
ence is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall make provisions 
for and direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administra-
tion or other fees may be paid from the fund. 
(2) The state treasurer shall: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assess-
ments from the State Tax Commission; and 
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to ensure 
maximum investment return for both long and short term 
investments in accordance with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(3) The commission may employ or retain counsel to repre-
sent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in proceedings brought 
to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon 
request of the commission, the attorney general shall aid in 
representation of the fund. 
(4) The liability of the state, its departments, agencies, 
instrumentalities, elected or appointed officials, or other duly 
authorized agents, with respect to payment of any compensa-
tion benefits, expenses, fees, medical expenses, or disburse-
ment properly chargeable against the Employers'Reinsurance 
Fund, is limited to the cash or assets in the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, and they are not otherwise, in any way, 
liable for the operation, debts, or obligations of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. 
(5) If injury causes death within a period of 312 weeks from 
the date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in 
Section 35-1-81, and further benefits in the amounts and to 
the persons as follows: 
(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the 
time of the death, the payment by the employer or its 
insurance carrier shall be 66WX> of the decedent's 
average weekly wage a t the time of the injury, but not 
more than a TrurHmnm of 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent 
minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but 
not exceeding the average weekly wage of the em-
ployee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week. Compensation shall continue 
during dependency for the remainder of the period 
between the date of the death and the expiration of 
312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The payment by the employer or its insurance 
carrier to wholly dependent persons during depen-
dency following the expiration of the first 312-week 
period described in Subsection (5XaXi) shall be an 
amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those 
wholly dependent persons during that initial 312-
week period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal 
Social Security death benefits paid to those wholly 
dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to 
review by the commission at the end of the initial 
312-week pericd and annually thereafter. If in any 
such review it is determined that, under the facts and 
circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is 
no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant 
may be considered a partly dependent or 
nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits 
as the commission may determine under Subsection 
(5)(bXii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determina-
tion, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee shall 
be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for 
a 312-week period from the date of death of the 
employee. This presumption shall not apply after the 
initial 312-week period and, in determining the then 
existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the 
commission shall exclude 50% of any federal Social 
Security death benefits received by that surviving 
spouse. 
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time 
of the death, the payment shall be 66Ts% of the 
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per 
week. Compensation shall continue during depen-
dency for the remainder of the period between the 
date of death and the expiration of 312 weeks after 
the date of injury as the commission in each case may 
determine. Compensation may not amount to more 
than a m^mnm of $30,000. The benefits provided 
for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the 
circumstances and conditions of dependency existing 
at the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the 
commission under this subsection shall be consistent 
with the general provisions of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly 
dependent under Subsection (5XaXiii) shall be deter-
mined by the commission in keeping with the circum-
stances and conditions of dependency existing at the 
time of the dependency review and may be paid in an 
amount not exceeding the mfl-ri-mmn weekly rate that 
partly dependent persons would receive if wholly 
dependent 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to 
such persons during their dependency by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also 
partly dependent persons at the time of death, the com-
mission may apportion the benefits as it considers just 
and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to 
all parties concerned do not exceed the maximum pro-
vided for by law. 19W 
